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1. Introduction 
 
 On August 1, 2006, Stanford University announced that Philip H. Knight, founder 
and chairman of Nike, Inc., would give $105 million to its Graduate School of Business 
(“GSB”).  The gift is believed to be the largest ever made to a business school.1  The event 
provides a stark example of a funding shock – a major change, whether positive or negative, 
in the level of funding available from endowment and external sources for university 
expenditures.  Other examples include receiving a major research grant, experiencing a sharp 
drop in the value of endowment investments, or experiencing a cut in state appropriations. 
A funding shock may be a highly significant event for an institution of higher 
learning.  The endowment of Stanford GSB was valued at $711.8 in 2005, so Knight’s 
donation increased it by about 15%.2  Events of this magnitude may affect financial aid, 
admissions, and enrollment decisions in important ways.3  Given the recent prevalence of 
both record donations to universities and colleges and ongoing cutbacks in federal and state 
funding, seeking an improved understanding of the impacts of funding shocks would seem 
warranted. 
This paper employs a theoretical model to examine the effect of a funding shock on 
optimal university decision-making with respect to the level of tuition charged to students, 
net of financial aid (“net tuition”); admissions selectivity; and enrollment.  The model 
considers a situation in which different student groups are characterized by different levels of 
                                                 
1 See “Record Donation for Stanford,” The San Jose Mercury News, accessed on August 6, 2006, at 
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/living/education/15178693.htm.  
2 Stanford University’s endowment is $15 billion; the donation increases this composite figure by less than 1%.  
But because professional schools are often treated as autonomous units financially, the 15% figure is probably 
more relevant. 
3 Though funding inflows often are specifically earmarked – $100 million of Knight’s gift, for example, will be 
devoted to constructing a new campus for the business school – they free up other university funds for general 
use. 
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relative attractiveness to the university, independent of objectively measurable quality.4  
Enrolled students with greater relative attractiveness carry greater weight in the university’s 
utility function; thus the university cares more both about enrolling more attractive students 
and about their relative quality when enrolled. 
A key recognition of the model is that students whose net tuition is set high relative to 
their costs of attending, whether because their relative attractiveness to the university is low 
or because the university’s resources are limited, are treated differently from other students 
by an optimizing university when a funding shock occurs.  I find that a positive shock, such 
as a major donation, lowers net tuition to all students, a result consistent with existing 
empirical work (Lowry, 2001; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004).  Not surprisingly, it also increases 
the university’s admissions selectivity with respect to all students, as the university balances 
competing goals of higher quantity and quality of students.  However, a positive funding 
shock results in lower enrollment for students whose net tuition is sufficiently high relative to 
cost, while resulting in higher enrollment for all others.  Conversely, a negative shock results 
in higher net tuition and lower selectivity with respect to all students, but increased 
enrollment for high-margin students, whereas other students’ enrollments are cut.  For this 
reason, I refer to high-margin students as “inferior goods” to the university, as the effect of 
additional funding on the university’s enrollment of these students is analogous to the effect 
of additional income on the quantity an individual consumes of an inferior good. 
There has been some recognition in the literature that certain student groups may be 
singled out by universities for use as revenue generators.  Mixon & Hsing (1994) state that 
public university administrators and state government officials take a particular interest in 
out-of-state students as a source of revenue, given that they typically pay a higher tuition 
                                                 
4 I follow Ehrenberg & Sherman (1984) in making this assumption. 
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price.  The authors go so far as to point out the importance to states of in-migration of 
students in light of recent budget cuts in higher education.  Balderston (1997) offers 
anecdotal evidence from the University of Michigan of the use of out-of-state enrollment to 
increase revenue.  However, it does not appear that anyone has systematically studied under 
what conditions a student group will be targeted in this way. 
In addition to shedding light on the effect of funding shocks per se, the model offers a 
comparative static framework that can be extended to analyze the effects on net tuition, 
selectivity, and enrollment of a wide array of changes in market conditions.  To illustrate, I 
use the model to analyze the effect on net tuition of a shock to direct-to-student financial aid.  
Some policymakers and analysts have contended that federal direct-to-student aid creates 
incentives for universities to raise their tuition levels.  This so-called “Bennett hypothesis” 
has received considerable scholarly attention, with a number of studies investigating its 
validity (e.g., McPherson & Schapiro, 1991; Hauptman & Krop, 1998; Turner, 1998; 
Cunningham, Wellman, Clinedinst & Merisotis, 2001). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
literature.  Section 3 describes the model.  In Section 4, the main results relating to the effects 
of funding shocks are presented.  In Section 5, the effect of an increase in federal direct-to-
student aid is considered.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
There is a substantial theoretical literature that uses utility-maximization models to 
describe university behavior.  Garvin (1980) and James (1990) offer detailed models in 
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which university utility depends on the quantity and quality of students and faculty (or, 
equivalently, research).  Both analyses focus primarily on specifying the university’s 
problem correctly and examining first-order conditions.  Garvin discusses a few very general 
comparative static results to exemplify the uses of his model.  Using a framework more 
closely resembling that in the present paper, Ehrenberg & Sherman (1984) focus on the 
student side of the university’s problem, abstracting from issues relating to faculty and 
administrative inputs.  They consider how optimal financial aid packages should be set, given 
varying student demand characteristics and basic variations in relative university preferences 
across student groups.  They draw a number of important conclusions about financial aid 
decision making, but do not address how changes in funding, as reflected in the university’s 
budget constraint, should affect such decisions. 
Two other theoretical analyses closely related to the present paper are offered by 
Fethke (2005, 2006), who uses a principal-agent framework to study the relationship of state 
appropriations to public university tuition levels in a context in which states compete.  In a 
decentralized baseline case, the state legislature chooses a higher education subsidy level to 
maximize a welfare function that sums the consumer surplus of students, university revenue, 
and direct utility from university enrollment.5  Meanwhile, the university cares only about its 
revenue and student surplus; it does not, independently, care about enrollment. 
Fethke (2005) performs a positive economic analysis on this framework.  He 
determines that the subsidy and tuition levels chosen depend upon the university’s and 
legislature’s relative preferences for revenue versus student surplus.  The paper also provides 
results regarding how relative preference levels for student surplus affect how subsidy and 
                                                 
5 In Fethke (2006), the legislature cares about enrollment only for resident (in-state) students; consequently, as 
described below, this paper distinguishes differential effects on resident and non-resident students of changes in 
various conditions. 
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tuition respond to increases in the demand for and marginal cost of education.  Fethke (2006) 
focuses on normative considerations, deriving vertical coordination strategies for arriving at 
optimal subsidy and tuition levels.  However, the paper also derives two descriptive 
conclusions that extend across the alternative strategic arrangements considered.  First, the 
difference between non-resident and resident tuition declines with decreases in state 
appropriations.  Second, it declines with increases in the demand for or cost of education. 
An important characteristic of Fethke’s framework is that he assumes state 
legislatures set subsidies strategically, recognizing the effect that they have on university 
tuition-setting.  Thus, he endogenizes the subsidies in the tuition model.  In contrast, I focus 
on the effects of exogenous shocks to university funding; this means, to the extent that my 
model applies to state appropriations, it assumes them to be exogenously determined. 
Also relevant to the present paper are a number of empirical studies that have 
considered the effects of state appropriations on tuition and enrollment at public institutions 
of higher education.  Estimating a simultaneous equations system using cross-sectional data, 
Koshal & Koshal (2000) find that lower state appropriations for higher education at in-state 
public universities are associated with higher tuition.  Similar results are found by 
Cunningham et al. (2001) for public research/doctoral and public comprehensive institutions.  
Lowry (2001) estimates the determinants of the major components of university revenue, 
including state appropriations and tuition and fees.  He finds that tuition and fee revenues are 
higher at institutions that receive less state funding per student.  Estimating a simultaneous 
equations system on panel data, Rizzo & Ehrenberg (2004) find that higher state budget 
appropriations correlate with lower in-state and out-of-state tuitions at public universities.  
They also find using a cross-section approach that state appropriations correlate negatively 
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with out-of-state share of enrollment.  This outcome seems consistent with the idea that out-
of-state students are tapped to replace revenue lost to state funding cuts; however, the authors 
do not find that the result holds when a difference-on-difference panel approach is applied 
using the same data.  Collectively, these studies of state appropriations offer insight into 
some of the ramifications of funding shocks, by reference to an important example of such 
shocks.  But no work has yet provided a conceptual understanding of how funding shocks, as 
a general phenomenon, affect key university decisions and, particularly, how they 
differentially affect different groups of students. 
 
3. Model 
 
Consider a university enrolling students from two different groups, 1, 2i = . The 
groups may be thought of as consisting of athletes and non-athletes, state residents and non-
resident students, poor and wealthy students, or any other appropriate dichotomy.  The 
university charges “net tuition,” iP , to group i, where net tuition consists of a positive level 
of full tuition, minus a nonnegative amount of institutional financial aid.  Net tuition may be 
viewed as differing for the two groups either because full tuition differs, financial aid 
packages differ, or both.6 
The net tuition level iP  generates a demand for admission (i.e., number of 
applicants), ( )i iQ P .  The groups’ demands are mutually independent and are given by a 
general functional form (Genesove & Mullin, 1998), 
                                                 
6 Under certain circumstances, universities may set different full tuition levels to different students, such as 
resident and non-resident students.  For a discussion of tuition differentials, see Balderston (1997). 
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 ( ) ( ) ii i i i iQ P b a P γ= −  (1) 
where 0ia >  is the student’s maximum willingness to pay, 0ib >  represents the size of the 
market, and 0iγ >  is an index of convexity.  Note that linear ( 1iγ = ) and quadratic ( 2iγ = ) 
demand curves, among other forms, are nested as special cases.  The university is generally 
considered to be selective, that is, it does not enroll every student who applies.  Rather, it 
accepts a share 0 1iφ≤ ≤  of the applicants from group i.  I assume that all accepted students 
enroll at the university, so enrollment iE  is defined i i iE Qφ≡ . 
The university obtains utility from enrolling students.  Its values are summarized by a 
weighted-enrollment utility function, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2, 1 ,U h E P h E Pα φ φ α φ φ= + −  (2) 
Here, ( )i ih φ  is the average quality level of accepted applicants in group i, and the weight 
0 1α≤ ≤  reflects the relative attractiveness of the two groups to university.  One may think 
of ih  as reflecting a composite of objective measures of academic quality, such as test scores 
and grade-point average.  Meanwhile, α  reflects the level of subjective preference on the 
part of university administrators for group 1 relative to group 2.7  Let ih  be defined as a 
linear function of iφ , 
 ( )i i i i ih φ µ σ φ= +  (3) 
                                                 
7 For a more extensive discussion of objective academic quality versus subjective attractiveness, see Ehrenberg 
& Sherman (1984). 
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where 0iµ >  and 0 i i iσ µ φ> > − .  Thus, ih  is a decreasing function of the share of 
applicants accepted, and is positive and bounded on its domain.8 
The university’s objective is to choose net tuition levels iP  and acceptance shares (or 
“selectivity” levels) iφ  to maximize (2) subject to breaking even on its operating account.  
This break-even requirement is summarized by the following resource constraint 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2R c P E , P c P E , P F 0≡ − φ + − φ − ≤  (4) 
where 0ic >  represents the marginal cost of enrolling students from group i, and F represents 
funds available from the endowment, government appropriations, and other non-student 
sources.  In words, (4) states that the net cost of enrolling students (after net tuition is 
subtracted out) must not exceed the funds available from non-student sources.   
In the context of this framework, a change in F will be termed a funding shock.  Note 
that a positive funding shock is equivalent to a relaxation of the resource constraint, while a 
negative shock equates to a tightening of the constraint.  As discussed in the introduction, the 
primary purpose of the analysis will be to understand how funding shocks affect the net 
tuition, selectivity, and enrollment decisions of the optimizing university.  Differentiating the 
expression for enrollment with respect to F and evaluating at the optimizing ( )* *,i iPφ  pair 
gives: 
 
* *
*i i i i
i i
i
E Q P Q
F P F F
φφ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (5) 
                                                 
8 Unlike Ehrenberg & Sherman (1984), I do not impose the restriction that total quality units never decrease 
with the number of students admitted, i.e., ( )' 1i i ih hφ φ > − .  The assumption is not necessary to ensure 
positive enrollment in the present model.  Further, by not imposing this restriction, one allows for the possibility 
that admitting low quality students might decrease the utility of the university, perhaps by damaging its prestige. 
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When the expression in (5) is positive, a positive shock to funding increases the equilibrium 
enrollment of group i.  This is intuitively what one would expect to happen to enrollment 
when more money is available to the university; after all, (2) shows that the university 
obtains utility from enrolling students.  But when this expression is negative, a positive shock 
to funding decreases the enrollment of group i.  This would seem to represent an anomaly.  
Why would a university cut back the number of students it enrolls from a group when it has 
more money with which to subsidize enrollment?  Paralleling the terminology of consumer 
theory, I will refer to a group of students i for whom 0iE
F
∂ >∂  as “normal goods” to the 
university.  A group of students for whom 0iE
F
∂ <∂  will be referred to as “inferior goods.”  
The main focus of the next section will be to explain when and why the anomalous outcome 
– inferiority – occurs. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Non-selective case 
 
Let us begin by considering the special case in which the university is not selective, 
that is, iφ  is fixed at 1.  Note that the second term of (5) vanishes in this case because iφ  is 
fixed.  Given 0i
i
Q
P
∂ <∂ , the sign of 
iE
F
∂
∂  depends solely on the sign of the effect of a funding 
shock on net tuition, 
*
iP
F
∂
∂ , which may be derived using comparative static techniques.  The 
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following result is obtained (all propositions, lemmas, and corollaries are proved in the 
appendix):9 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  At a non-selective university, negative funding shocks should result in 
higher net tuition for all groups and reduced enrollment for all groups.  Therefore, no groups 
are inferior goods. 
 
 A non-selective university has only one instrument with which to both manage 
enrollment and collect revenue from each group – net tuition.  When funding is cut, it must 
use this instrument to raise the needed additional revenue.  If lowering tuition to any group 
would have increased revenue from that group, the university would already have done this 
before funding was cut, because doing so would also have increased enrollment.  Therefore 
the effects of a funding cut on net tuition and enrollment are unambiguous. 
 
4.2 Selective case 
 
 Now assume the university can both set net tuition and decide on a portion of 
applicants to admit from each group of students.  The sign of iE
F
∂
∂  now depends on the signs 
of 
*
iP
F
∂
∂  and 
*
i
F
φ∂
∂ , as well as the relative size of the two terms in (5).  Again, comparative 
static techniques are used to make the necessary determinations.  First, it may be shown that: 
                                                 
9 This proposition and all other model results pertaining to the effects of funding shocks are written in terms of 
the effect of a negative shock (i.e., a reduction in funding).  The effect of positive funding shock is simply the 
inverse of what is stated in each case. 
 11
 
PROPOSITION 2: At a selective university, negative funding shocks should result in higher 
net tuition for all groups and reduced admissions selectivity for all groups. 
 
By lowering standards, the university is able to admit more students, thus offsetting 
somewhat the reduction in enrollment that occurs from raising net tuition.  Though doing so 
means the university must accept some reduction in average quality, it optimally balances 
this cost against the cost of reducing enrollment. The new balance that is struck following a 
reduction in funding involves some increase in net tuition and some reduction in selectivity. 
 Before turning to the conditions for inferiority in the selective case, it is helpful to 
understand the determinants of the sign of the tuition-cost margin, i iP c− .  These are laid out 
in the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Students should be charged net tuition greater than their marginal cost of 
enrollment if their group’s relative attractiveness to the university is low enough or if 
endowment and other non-tuition funding sources are sufficiently limited. 
 
The proposition formalizes the conditions that result in a group of students cross-subsidizing 
other activities of the university.10  Not surprisingly, if a group is of very low relative 
attractiveness to the university, its tuition revenues will be used to fund the enrollment of 
more attractive groups.  But a student group may end up subsidizing university operations 
even if it does not exhibit low relative attractiveness, if the university is truly impoverished. 
                                                 
10 See James (1990). 
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 The following proposition establishes an important qualitative result relating to the 
i iP c>  case: 
 
PROPOSITION 4: When a group is charged net tuition in excess of its marginal cost of 
enrollment, the university admits from the group some students that are of such low quality 
that they make a negative contribution to the university’s utility. 
 
The university admits students from a group until the utility contributed by the marginal 
student just equals the net monetary cost of enrolling that student.  Since i iP c> , the 
university incurs a negative net cost (i.e., earns a positive return) from enrolling students.  
This means that the marginal student will provide the university with negative utility. 
One way to think about the meaning of this is to think of a university’s student body 
as consisting of two types of students: prestige generators and revenue generators.  On the 
one hand, a selective university desires students that reflect well on the institution, and it will 
often be willing to pay handsomely to have such students, offering them lavish financial aid 
packages.  On the other hand, the university may be willing to take on some real 
“undesirables” from a prestige perspective, if it gets sufficient money to do so.  So, though 
we might think of the former type of student as “favored” and the latter “disfavored” by the 
university, it is perhaps truer to say that the university wants both types of student around, 
but for different reasons. 
Now let us return to the question of inferiority.  The following proposition offers the 
main result with respect to the effect of a funding shock on equilibrium enrollment: 
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PROPOSITION 5 (Inferiority condition): Negative funding shocks reduce the equilibrium 
enrollment level for all groups, except for groups for whom 1
1
i i i
i i i
P c
P
γ
γ ε
− > + , where iε  is 
group i’s demand elasticity.  For these groups, negative shocks should result in an increase in 
enrollment. 
 
That is, when a group’s tuition-cost margin is sufficiently elevated given demand elasticity 
(and the extent of demand convexity), funding cuts should actually cause the group’s 
enrollment to increase.  In effect, when more money is needed, the university manipulates net 
tuition and selectivity to increase the enrollment of groups whose members generate 
sufficient revenue.  Note that the higher the demand elasticity, the lower the threshold for 
inferiority (i.e., closer to i iP c= ).  Intuitively, a university will raise net tuition less in the 
face of funding cuts for groups exhibiting greater demand elasticity, making it more likely 
that their enrollment will increase rather than decrease. 
This finding leads to an important general prediction: the optimizing university’s 
student population will shift in favor of student groups that cover their costs when money is 
tight.  Conversely, it will generally shift in favor of groups that depend on subsidization 
when money is easy.  Put another way, the composition of a student body can be expected to 
shift with the university’s financial fortunes, alternating between prestige-generating students 
and revenue-generating students. 
 14
 While Proposition 5 has intuitive appeal in that it makes a connection between 
inferior good status and a group’s tuition-cost margin, it would also be useful to connect 
inferiority with exogenous group characteristics.  Hence, the following corollary is offered:11 
 
COROLLARY 1: An optimizing university will increase a group’s enrollment in the face of 
a negative funding shock if the group exhibits sufficiently low relative attractiveness to the 
university, or if endowment and other non-tuition funding sources are sufficiently limited. 
 
Note that if a university’s resources are sufficiently constrained, all its students could 
be inferior goods.  Funding cuts would lead to increased enrollment for all, while increases in 
non-tuition funding would lead to a general reduction in enrollment.  This may seem topsy-
turvy, but recall that when a group is charged net tuition greater than its marginal cost of 
enrollment, some students are enrolled who make a negative contribution to the university’s 
utility.  Reducing enrollment for such groups by increasing admissions standards actually 
increases utility.  Thus, “weeding out” undesirable students from a body of applicants may be 
thought of as a luxury that the resource-constrained university enjoys when it receives a 
positive shock to its funding.12 
 A stylized fact that follows from Proposition 2 is that, for normal good students, the 
enrollment effect of changes in net tuition brought about by funding shocks dominates the 
                                                 
11 The result parallels Proposition 3. 
12 The inferior good status described in the model is more properly termed “quasi-inferiority,” because the 
university still enrolls more quality units from the inferior good group when a positive funding shock occurs.  
For true inferiority, it would be necessary for the marginal utility to the university of a group of students to be 
dependent on the number of students enrolled from the other group.  Thus, the university would enroll fewer 
inferior good students because it is substituting normal good students and no longer needs the former.  Since I 
have made the utility function additively separable, however, the marginal utilities are independent.  Note that 
the phenomenon of quasi-inferiority is what allows for the possibility that all student groups are “inferior 
goods.”  With true inferiority, an economy must always have at least one normal good. 
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enrollment effect of changes in selectivity, while for inferior good students, the opposite is 
true.  Thus: 
 
PROPOSITION 6:  Given equivalent demand for admission, iQ , and equivalent 
responsiveness of enrollment to changes in net tuition, ii
i
Q
P
φ ∂∂ , for both types of groups, 
normal good student groups experience greater volatility in net tuition and lower volatility in 
admissions standards in response to funding shocks than inferior good students. 
 
All else being equal, inferior good students’ average quality will tend to be highly variable in 
response to funding shocks.  Meanwhile, these students will not tend to suffer large 
fluctuations in their cost of attending as a consequence of such shocks.  However, normal 
good students will suffer such fluctuations, while their average quality level will tend to be 
more stable. 
 
5. Effect of an increase in federal direct-to-student aid 
 
In this section, I use the framework introduced above to investigate a controversial 
issue raised with respect to federally administered financial aid.  William Bennett, the 
Secretary of Education under President Reagan, asserted in the mid-1980s that federal 
financial aid programs “enable” universities and colleges to increase their tuition by allowing 
them to rely on aid to cushion the effects of increases (Bennett, 1987).  Analysts have 
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provided two main rationalizations of Bennett’s assertion.13  First, properly-targeted aid 
shifts outward the demand curve for higher education by increasing the number of 
individuals that can afford to attend.  This, it is argued, motivates institutions to increase 
tuition by making such increases more profitable.  Second, federal aid programs create direct 
incentives for raising tuition by making aid awards dependent upon student need, where 
“need” is defined in part based on the size of tuition. 
To this day, Bennett’s hypothesis remains a topic of intense debate.  A number of 
studies have attempted to discern whether federal direct aid leads to increased tuition, and if 
so, under what circumstances this occurs.  Hauptman & Krop (1998) point to trend data as 
evidence that the increased availability of federally guaranteed loans has accommodated 
increases in tuition.  McPherson & Schapiro (1991) analyze a simultaneous equations model 
incorporating number of university decision variables.  They find no evidence of a 
relationship between federal grant aid and tuition increases for private institutions.  However, 
they do find a significant positive relationship for public 4-year institutions.  This they 
attribute to the fact that public institutions might have tuition low enough that raising it could 
affect student qualification for major federal award programs, such as the Pell grant or 
Guaranteed Student Loan.  Turner (1998) turns the issue on its head, asking to what extent 
the benefits of the Pell grant program flow to its intended beneficiaries.  Her theoretical 
analysis suggests that universities already giving substantial institutional aid to needy 
students may seize on Pell grants as an opportunity to free up those funds for other uses, thus 
partially diverting Pell program benefits.  Cunningham et al. (2001) perform a series of 
reduced-form regressions to explain changes in tuition at seven different types of higher 
education institutions (e.g., public research/doctoral, public comprehensive, etc.).  They find 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., McPherson & Schapiro (1991), p. 68. 
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no relationship between any form of external grant aid, including federal grant aid, and 
changes in tuition at any of the seven institution types. 
In the wake of this work, one conceptual issue that remains open is whether the 
increase in demand brought about by a positive shock to federal direct-to-student aid would 
indeed lead to an unambiguous increase in tuition.  In the model introduced in Section 3, a 
shift in demand may be represented by a change in ib  in (1).  It can be shown that the effect 
of an increase in demand on net tuition is proportional to the effect of a positive funding 
shock on net tuition, where the proportionality factor is14 
 ( ) ( ) ii i i i ic P a P γφ− − −  (6) 
Proposition 2 establishes that a positive funding shock results in decreased net tuition, so the 
effect of an increase in demand takes the sign of i ic P− .  In words, an increase in demand for 
education results in higher net tuition when net tuition is less than marginal cost, and lower 
net tuition when net tuition is greater than marginal cost.  Intuitively, an increase in demand 
causes the university to lower net tuition if it generates revenue for the university (by 
increasing the enrollment of revenue-generating students), while it causes the university to 
raise net tuition if it drains revenue away (by increasing the enrollment of subsidized, 
prestige-generating students).15 
 Consider the implications of this for the Bennett hypothesis.  First, an increase in 
demand does not necessarily lead to increased tuition at a utility-maximizing university the 
way it would at a profit-maximizing firm.  This suggests that Bennett may have based his 
hypothesis, at least in part, on an incorrect assumption.  Second, caution should be exercised 
                                                 
14 See appendix. 
15 This appears consistent with Fethke’s (2006) result that the gap between nonresident and resident tuition at 
public universities varies negatively with the (overall) demand for higher education 
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in interpreting McPherson & Schapiro’s (1991) differing results for public and private 
institutions as indicating that public universities are trying to game the structure of the Pell 
program.  Given a mission to provide an affordable education to resident students, most 
public universities probably have a greater percentage of students paying net tuition below 
marginal cost than private universities.  Thus, public four-year institutions might see average 
tuition levels increase with increases in federal student aid because the average student pays 
net tuition below cost.  Meanwhile, private four-year institutions might not see an increase in 
their average tuition level because the average student pays net tuition close to or above cost.  
McPherson & Schapiro’s (1991) results may simply reflect differences in the tuition-cost 
margins of students at public versus private institutions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At an inn visited by the author while researching this paper hangs a sign that reads, 
“All visitors bring us happiness – some when they come, and some when they leave.”  In 
perhaps a similar spirit, as this paper has suggested, all students benefit the university – some 
by bringing prestige or an uplifting sense of having served some community of interest, and 
some by bringing money.  The model developed in the paper has demonstrated that, in the 
face of a negative shock to university funding, the former group’s enrollment is reduced, 
while the latter group’s enrollment is increased.  The opposite occurs when there is a positive 
shock to funding.  The university’s “favored” students (those bringing prestige) experience 
greater volatility in net tuition than the “disfavored” students (those bringing money), while 
the disfavored students experience greater volatility in admissions standards than the favored 
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students.  This makes it possible for favored and disfavored student enrollments to be 
negatively correlated in the face of a funding shock, while both groups of students experience 
the same direction of movement of net tuition and admissions selectivity. 
As the model has demonstrated, in instances where university resources are extremely 
tight, students may be charged high net tuition relative to cost even when they exhibit high 
relative attractiveness to the university.  Thus, even student groups that are relatively favored 
may play primarily a funding role for the university, so their enrollment levels may vary 
negatively with funding shocks. 
The model’s results were applied to analyzing the question of whether increases to 
federal direct-to-student aid lead universities to increase tuition.  It was found that, for a 
utility-maximizing institution, increases in tuition do not necessarily follow from increases in 
demand.  The particular pattern of increases predicted by the model is consistent with 
empirical outcomes previously attributed to public universities strategically increasing tuition 
to take advantage of the structure of federal aid programs.  The model shows, in effect, that 
this pattern may result without such strategic behavior. 
The results have important implications.  James (1990) states that public universities 
face greater uncertainty with respect to their funding than private universities, because they 
are dependent for that much of that funding on the whim of a small group of people – state 
legislators and executives.  It seems obvious, therefore, that public universities will face 
greater vicissitudes of tuition, admissions standards, and enrollment.  But the model suggests 
something more subtle, that there are two constituencies affected differently by the 
uncertainty of life at the public university.  There are subsidized students whose cost of 
attending fluctuates substantially; and subsidizing students, of whom the average academic 
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quality level fluctuates substantially (to the extent that they are “inferior goods”).  Public 
universities may anticipate unique social problems and challenges for their student 
communities as a result of this mix. 
There are other implications for public university administrators.  It has been 
suggested that governing boards should raise nonresident tuition to offset losses of university 
revenue that follow from decreases in state appropriations.  The model in this paper suggests 
that, when nonresidents are being priced at a large margin already, the key is rather to 
manipulate tuition and admissions standards together to increase nonresident enrollment.  
Though this may seem undesirable to some public universities, it appears to be the most 
effective way to avoid substantially raising the tuition or curbing the enrollment of residents. 
The predictions of the model should be examined empirically.  An empirical analysis 
that considers common effects across a range of funding shocks would contribute to our 
understanding of these phenomena.  It would also be useful to re-examine the effects of 
changes in state appropriation levels, taking account of the possibility that different students 
may be affected by these changes in different ways.  Finally, the effect of federal student aid 
on tuition should be re-examined, accounting for different impacts on different groups of 
students. 
 
Appendix A.  Proofs 
 
Proposition 1: The non-selective university’s problem is to choose iP  to maximize (2) 
subject to (4) and 1iφ = .  The corresponding Lagrangian function is 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
, , 1
( ) ( )
NSL P P h Q P h Q P
c P Q P c P Q P F
λ α α
λ
≡ + −
+ − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (A1) 
 
where 0λ <  and 0i i ih µ σ≡ + > .  Let us assume an interior solution, so that the constraint in 
(4) is binding.  The first-order conditions (“FOCs”) are 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
0
1 0
Q Qh c P Q
P P
Q Qh c P Q
P P
c P Q c P Q F
α λ
α λ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂+ − − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + − − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
− + − =
 (A2) 
Using Cramer’s rule, we obtain16 
 
2*
1
2
2 1
1 NSLP R
F H P P
∂∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ ∂  (A3) 
where H  is the Hessian of the system, which is constrained to be positive by the second-
order condition for a maximum.  Because the university sets net tuition below the profit-
maximizing level, 
1
0R
P
∂ <∂  over the relevant range, which means 
*
1P
F
∂
∂  takes the sign of  
2
2
2
NSL
P
∂
∂ . 
Using (A1), ( ) ( )2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2NSL Q Q Qh c P
P P P P
α λ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − + − −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ .  Using substitutions 
from (1) and (A2), this reduces to ( )( ) 2 12 2 2 21 0b a P γγλ −−+ < .  ■ 
 
                                                 
16 Given symmetry, it is sufficient to derive comparative static results for group 1; corresponding conclusions 
may be drawn for both groups. 
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Proposition 2: With the university choosing both iP  and iφ  (i=1,2) to maximize (2) subject 
to (4), the Lagrangian function generalizes to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1
( ) ( )
SL h Q P h Q P
c P Q P c P Q P F
α φ φ α φ φ
λ φ φ
= + −
+ − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (A4) 
The FOCs for an interior solution grow more complex, to wit, 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
0
1 0
0
1 1 0
Q Qh c P Q
P P
Q Qh c P Q
P P
h Q Q c P Q
h Q Q c P Q
c P Q c P Q F
α φ λ φ φ
α φ λ φ φ
α ασ φ λ
α α σ φ λ
φ φ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂+ − − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + − − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
+ + − =
− + − + − =
− + − =
 (A5) 
Using Cramer’s rule and simplifying, 
 
22 2 2 2 2*
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
22 2 2 2 2*
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
1
S S S S S
S S S S S
L L L L LP R R
F H P P P P
L L L L LR R
F H P P P P P
φ φ φ φ φ
φ
φ φ φ φ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎜ ⎟= − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 (A6) 
where, again, 0H >  is the Hessian of the system.  The second parenthetical expression is 
the same in each of the two equations, while the first parenthetical expression differs between 
the two. 
All three expressions may be signed unambiguously.  Using (A4) and substitutions 
from (A5), ( )2 2 22
2
2 1SL Qα σφ
∂ = −∂  and 
2
2
2 2
SL Q
P
λφ
∂ = −∂ ∂ .  Comparing (A1) and (A4) reveals 
2 2
12 2
2 2
S NSL L
P P
φ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ , therefore, using the proof of Proposition 1, 
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( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
22 2 2
1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1 2 1
1
2 1
S S SL L L b a P Q Q
P P
Q Q
a P
γλ φ γ α σ λφ φ
λφ γ α σ λ
−⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤− = + − − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
+⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦−⎣ ⎦
 
The FOCs (A5) give ( )( ) ( )2 22 2 2 2 2
1 h
c P a P
α γλ γ
− −= − + −  and 
( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
h a P
c P a P
σ φ γ
− −= − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
, 
therefore 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
22 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 22 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 12 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1
22
2 1
1 1 1 1
11 2
211
2
1
S S SL L L hQ
P P a P c P a P
h a P hQ
a P c P a Pc P a P
Q h
c P a
γ γλ α σ φφ φ γ
γ γλ α γγ
γλ α γ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ +⎪ ⎪− = − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − − + −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤+⎪ ⎪= − +⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥− − + −− + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
+= − − − + ( )1 0P
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪ >⎨ ⎬−⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 
This uses the fact that ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 0c P a Pγ− + − > , by the first FOC equation in (A5).  Now, 
using symmetry, 
2
1 12
1
2SL Qασφ
∂ =∂  and 
2
1
1 1
SL Q
P
λφ
∂ = −∂ ∂ .  Therefore, using (4) and (A4), and 
substitutions from (1) and (A5), 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1 1 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
2
2
2 0
S S c P a PL LR R Q c P Q Q
P P a P
hQ c P Q
Q c P h Q
Q c P h Q c P h
γλ ασ φφ φ φ
λ ασ φ σ φ
λ α
λ α λ α ασ φ
⎧ ⎫− + −⎡ ⎤∂ ∂∂ ∂ ⎪ ⎪− = − − + ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤= − − + − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= − − + −
= − − + < − − + + =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Thus, 
*
1 0P
F
∂ <∂ . 
 It remains to show that 
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 1
0S SL LR R
P P Pφ φ
∂ ∂∂ ∂− >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .  Using 
2 2
12 2
1 1
S NSL L
P P
φ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ , 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2
1 1
1
1
1
1
S S c P a PL LR R b a P c P Q Q Q
P P P a P
Q c P a P
c P Q Q
a P a P
Q c P c P a P
a P
Q
a
γ γλ φ γ λ φφ φ
λ γ φ γλ φ
λ φ γ γ
λ φ
− − + −⎡ ⎤∂ ∂∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤− = + − − + − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −⎣ ⎦
+ − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= + − − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦−
= − ( ) ( ){ } ( )
2
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
0Qc P a P c a
P a P
λ φ− − − = − >−
 
Thus, 
*
1 0
F
φ∂ <∂ .  ■ 
 
Proposition 3: Manipulating the FOCs (A5) using (1), one obtains 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1
c P a P
h h
λ λα γ
− − −= − .  1 1P c=  implies ( )1 1
1 1
a c
h
λα γ
−= − .  If 
*
1 0Pα
∂ <∂  can be 
demonstrated, then ( )1 1
1 1
a c
h
λα γ
−< −  implies 1 1P c> , proving the claim about relative 
attractiveness.  Using Cramer’s rule, 
[ ]
( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2*
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
S S S S S S
S S S
L L L L L LQR R R R R R
h Q h
P P P P P P P P
L L LP Q R
h Q h
H P P P P
σ φ φφ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
σ φ φα φ φ φ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− + − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= + + −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎫⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎭
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
( )
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
22 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
S S S
S S S
L L LR R R R R
P P P P
L L LQR R R
h Q h
P P P P
φ φ φ φ φ
σ φ φφ φ φ φ
∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂+ + − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎤⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠
 
Manipulating the FOCs (A5) yields ( ) 11 1 1 1
1
Rh Q λσ φ α φ
∂+ = − ∂  and 
1 1
1 1
1 1
Q Rh
P P
λφ α
∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ .  Using 
this, 
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( )
2 2 2 2 2 2*
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1
S S S S S SL L L L L LP R R R R R R R R
H P P P P P P P P
λ
α α α φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − − −∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎦
 
The first expression in parentheses is positive, from proof of Proposition 2.  It remains to 
show that the expression in brackets is positive.  Using (4) and substitutions from the proof 
of Proposition 2, the bracketed expression becomes 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
22 22 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
1
2 1
QQ c P Q c P Q
P
Q QQ c P Q c P Q
P P
λ φ φ
λφ γα σ φ φ γ
⎡ ⎤∂− − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∂⎣ ⎦
+⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− − − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
The FOCs (A5) yield 2 22 2 2 2
21
QQ Q
P
λσ φ α
⎛ ⎞− ∂= ⎜ ⎟∂− ⎝ ⎠
; substituting this into the expression and 
rearranging obtains 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
22
2 22 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2
22
2 22 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
22
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2
1 2 2
2
0
Q Q Qc P c P Q QQ P P
P
Q Q Qc P c P Q QQ P P
P
Q Qc P QQ P
P
λφ γ
γ
λφ
λφ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞+ ∂ ∂⎪ ⎪− − − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∂
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎪ ⎪> − − − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∂
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂= − − >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∂
 
 
Thus, 
*
1 0Pα
∂ <∂ . 
Concerning the claim about limited funding, note that λ  sufficiently large and 1h  
sufficiently small lead to 1 1P c>  even for large values of α .  
*
1 0
F
φ∂ <∂  implies 1h  gets 
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smaller as funding dwindles.  One needs only to show 
*
0.
F
λ∂ >∂   By Cramer’s rule, and using 
the proof of Proposition 2 and symmetry, 
2 22 2 2 2 2 2*
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 0S S S S S SL L L L L L
F H P P P P
λ
φ φ φ φ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= − − >⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.  ■ 
 
Proposition 4: Define i i i iT h Qφ≡  as the total quality units from enrolled students in group i.  
Then, (2) may be written ( )1 21U T Tα α= + − .  Examine the third and fourth equations in the 
FOCs (A5).  If i iP c> , then the third term of the relevant equation is positive, implying 
0ii i i i i
i
dTh Q Q
d
σ φ φ+ = < .  Thus, the marginal student from group i decreases the university’s 
utility.  ■ 
 
Proposition 5: Using (5) and (A6), and substitutions from the proof of Proposition 2, 
( )( ) ( )22 2 2 221 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2
2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 2S S SL L LE Q QQ c P h Q c a
F H P P P a P
λ φφ λ αφ φ
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂⎜ ⎟= − − − + − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
Using 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1
1
1
c P a P
h
λ γα γ
− − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=  from the FOCs (A5), this simplifies to 
 ( )( ) ( )
22 2 2
1 1 1 1 121 1
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 1
11 S S S c P a PL L LE Q Q
F H P P P
γφ λ φ φ γ
⎛ ⎞ + − + −⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
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Given 
22 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
0S S SL L L
P Pφ φ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂− >⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 from the Proof of Proposition 2, this expression takes the 
sign of ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 c P a Pγ + − + − .  Using (1), one can write ( )1 1 1 1 1P a Pε γ= − , therefore 
1 0E
F
∂ <∂  is equivalent to 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
P c
P
γ
γ ε
− > + .  ■ 
 
Corollary 1: From the FOCs (A5), using ( )1 1 1 1 1P a Pε γ= − , one can write 
1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1P c h
P P
αλ ε
− = + .  Solving together with 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
P c
P
γ
γ ε
− = +  yields 
( )
( )1 11 1 1 2
a c
h
λα γ γ
−= − + .  
Because 
*
1 0Pα
∂ <∂ , 
( )
( )1 11 1 1 2
a c
h
λα γ γ
−< − +  implies 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
P c
P
γ
γ ε
− > + .  This proves the claim about 
relative attractiveness. 
Note that λ  sufficiently large and 1h  sufficiently small lead to 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
P c
P
γ
γ ε
− > +  
even for relatively large values of α .  Therefore, 
*
1 0
F
φ∂ <∂  and 
*
0
F
λ∂ >∂  prove the claim 
about limited funding.  ■ 
 
Proposition 6: This follows from Proposition 2 by inspection of (5), given 0iQ > , 0i
i
Q
P
∂ <∂ , 
and 0iφ > .  ■ 
 
Appendix B.  Effect on net tuition of an increase in demand 
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 The effect that a change in an exogenous market variable, such as demand, has on net 
tuition and selectivity may be decomposed in a Slutsky-like manner.17  For example, the 
effect on net tuition of a change in a variable 1x  may be written: 
 
* **
1 1 1
D
i i iP P PR
x x x R
∂ ∂ ∂∂= −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (A7) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (A7) is the substitution effect, or direct effect of a 
change in 1x , holding utility constant.  The second term is the income effect, or indirect effect 
of a change in 1x  via university resources.  The first component in the income effect, 
*
1
R
x
∂− ∂ , 
is the effect of a change in 1x  on the resource constraint, times -1.  The second component, 
*
iP
R
∂
∂ , is the effect on net tuition of loosening the resource constraint by $1.  Hence, 
* *
i iP P
R F
∂ ∂≡∂ ∂ .  It follows that the income effect of a change in exogenous condition 1x  is 
proportional to the effect of a positive funding shock, and the proportionality factor is 
*
1
R
x
∂− ∂ . 
 Now let us use (A7) to analyze the effect of an isoelastic shift in demand, given by ib  
in (1),  on net tuition.  Given 0i ibε∂ ∂ =  and constant marginal cost, the substitution effect, 
1
D
iP
b
∂
∂ , is zero.  Intuitively, if the demand shift does not cause demand elasticity or marginal 
cost to change, then no changes occur in the relative conditions between the two groups that 
would cause group i’s tuition to rise or fall.  This means the effect of a demand shift is solely 
                                                 
17 For further discussion on decomposing the effects of exogenous changes, see Varian (1984) and Nagler 
(2006). 
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the income effect, which is proportional to the effect of a positive funding shock.  
Specifically, 
 ( ) ( )* * * ** * ii i i ii i i i i
i i i
P P P PR R c P a P
b R b F b F
γφ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂= − = − = − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (A8) 
This result may be verified directly using comparative static techniques. 
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